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R. Michael Alvarez 
In the immediate wake of the 2000 presidential election, the Caltech/MIT Voting 
Technology Project was initiated.  The initial and primary concern of the VTP at that 
moment was to understand the problems that arose in the 2000 American presidential 
election, in particular with regards to voting technologies, and to develop scientifically-
based proposals for reforms and perhaps even to propose new voting technologies.   In the 
past decade, the VTP has moved from that original focus to become an internationally-
renown group of researchers who now focus on a broad array of election administration 
issues. 
One of the less obvious contributions of the VTP during this decade has been how VTP 
researchers have involved graduate and undergraduate students in these research 
activities, and how that has helped to fuel the development of what may eventually become 
a new, multidisciplinary academic research discipline examining election administration 
and voting technologies.  The milestone event of the publication of our 100th VTP Working 
Paper, though, helps to shed light on the educational role that VTP researchers have played 
in the past decade. 
For example, of the first ten VTP Working Papers that were published, five were either 
written by VTP-related students or were co-authored by VTP researchers with their 
students.  For example, VTP Working Paper #1 was written by Melanie Goodrich, detailing 
her research while an undergraduate student at Caltech, on “19th Century Ballot Reform in 
California:  A Study of the Huntington Library’s Political Ephemera Collection.”  Goodrich 
closely studied the Huntington’s collection of 19th century paper ballots, documenting the 
evolution of ballot design and styles in an important period of American electoral history.  
Goodrich has since gone to graduate studies in political science at NYU, and is now working 
for an international government consulting firm in the Washington D.C. area.  Another of 
the early VTP Working Papers was written by Sarah Sled, a Ph.D. student at MIT --- Sled 
wrote about the “Vertical Proximity Effects in the California Recall Election”, and her work 
was then also presented in Working Paper #9 (which was eventually published in the 
journal PS:  Political Science and Politics).  After receiving her graduate degree, Sled now 
works in the private sector.   
Another important example here is VTP Working Paper #7, co-authored by Betsy Sinclair 
and myself.  This paper, which was later published in the journal Political Research 
Quarterly, takes a close look at residual votes across precincts in Los Angeles County, thus 
holding voting systems constant.  Other than the substantive and methodological 
contribution of this research paper, it is important to note that Sinclair was an 
undergraduate student from the University of Redlands when she began the data collection 
and analysis that formed the basis for this paper; she then received her Ph.D. from Caltech 
and is now an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.   
Further examples abound when you scan the list of the first 99 VTP Working Papers.  My 
unofficial tally indicates that 12 of the 99 are Working Papers that were single-authored by 
graduate or undergraduate students working with the VTP; 25 of the 99 have graduate or 
undergraduate students as co-authors with VTP faculty researchers.  Thus, over a third of 
the VTP Working Papers published in the past decade have involved undergraduate or 
graduate student co-authors. 
While I have not done an extensive study, I am aware of no other multidisciplinary, multi-
institution research project that has existed for at least a decade --- and which has 
developed such a strong tradition of student involvement in research products.  Many of 
the undergraduates who have been involved in VTP research have gone to get graduate 
degrees, and some are now producing additional research that is helping to improve our 
understanding of election administration in the U.S. and abroad.  The graduate students 
involved in VTP research have taken academic positions in the U.S. and abroad, or are 
working in the private sector --- applying the research skills developed in their work with 
VTP faculty. 
This is one of the most important, but hidden, ways in which the Caltech/MIT Voting 
Technology Project has influenced the science of election administration and technology --- 
helping to train the next generation of public and private sector researchers who are 
themselves now conducting further independent research.  As we take this time to reflect 
upon the milestone of our project’s publication of the 100th Working Paper, it is important 
to observe how this intellectual record reflects the educational impact of the Voting 
Technology Project. 
Ronald L. Rivest 
Since its inception, the CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project has helped to energize 
voting research in this country and to provide factual unbiased information to researchers, 
election officials, policy-makers, and vendors.  Since it is not a lobbying organization 
nor an advocacy group for a particular cause, others have learned to seek out the VTP for 
guidance.  The VTP has also on various occasions provided a neutral meeting ground for 
vendors, election officials, and researchers. 
 
Running elections well is a tremendous challenge.  As technology advances, this challenge 
increases, as one needs to ferret out technological risks hidden amongst the technological 
opportunities. 
 
We are surely but slowly learning the lesson the ``low-tech is good'' with respect to security 
of voting systems.  Complexity is the enemy of security (indeed, large complex systems are 
almost insecure by definition).  It has been good to see many in this country return to 
simple paper ballots during the last decade, after realizing that the promise of DRE's was 
broken by the resulting unverifiability and unauditability of election outcomes. 
 
The VTP has played a role in developing more efficient methods for conducting post-
election audits, resulting in need to hand-count far fewer ballots to achieve a given level of 
confidence in the election outcome.  This is still an active area of research, and the ability to 
work with single ballots at a time---instead of single precincts at a time---promises even 
further efficiencies. 
 
We have also worked with others on the pioneering of techniques that utilize cryptography 
in ways that enable voters, and even the public at large, to verify the correctness of election 
tallies, without violating the privacy of ballots.  One such method (the ``scantegrity'' 
method), was used successfully in the municipal election of Takoma Park, Maryland in 
November 2009. 
 
Our work in voting technology has also been synergistic with my service on the Technology 
Guidelines Development Committee, advisory to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 
which is developing new standards for the certification of voting systems in the U.S. 
The notion of ``software independent'' voting systems was proposed to the TGDC as a way 
of capturing the fundamental requirement that election outcomes should be auditable 
without having to place trust irrevocably in the hands of a piece of complex software. 
 
Looking ahead, it is clear that the promise of ``internet voting'' will have to be tempered 
with realistic assessments of the associated risks.  At present, it is quite clear that the 
technology does not yet exist that would enable the electronic return of cast ballots over 
the Internet in a sufficiently secure manner.  (On the other hand, the delivery of election 
information and even blank ballots to the voter over the internet seems quite reasonable.) 
 
The improvement of election systems is clearly a never-ending process. Careful research, 
such as that performed by members of the CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, can 
continue help steer such improvements in Wthe best directions. 
 
 
 
 Charles Stewart III 
Where are the cool gadgets? 
 
As the name implies, the original aspirations of the Voting Technology Project pertained to 
the intersection of technology and democracy.  To make the point, consider the language of 
the cover letter, signed by Caltech President David Baltimore and MIT President Charles 
Vest, that accompanied the VTP’s often-cited 2001 report, Voting: What Is/What Could Be: 
 
The California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology saw a need for strong academic guidance in this intersection of 
technology with democracy. As the presidents of these two Institutes, we are 
proud to have mobilized a team of computer scientists, human factors 
engineers, mechanical engineers, and social scientists to respond to this 
national need. [Note the ordering of the professions listed.] 
 
The Voting Technology Project team began its research with a desire to 
evaluate existing voting technologies to determine whether they meet the 
country’s needs for a secure, reliable, robust system of recording election 
preferences. 
 
It is evident that problems with counting the votes of the citizens of Florida 
and elsewhere originated in unsound technology.  In the last election, 
Americans learned that at the heart of their democratic process, their “can-
do” spirit has “make-do” technology as its central element. 
 
The establishment of the VTP as an organization that was focused on technology coincided 
with the nation’s fixation on the technological breakdowns in Florida, exemplified by 
hanging chad (mechanical failure) and butterfly ballots (human factor failure).  The 
substance of the summer 2001 report planted the seed for a reconsideration of this focus.  
Buried in the report was the startling estimate that of 4–6 million lost votes in the 2000 
election, only 1.5–2 million were accounted for by machine failures, of the mechanical or 
human factor type.  By far more numerous were problems associated with registration 
mix-ups (1.5–3 million) and polling place practices (up to 1 million).  This was in addition 
to losses on the absentee vote side, which were un-estimated, but now appear to be equally 
as large, in total numbers, and much larger, as a percentage of ballots cast.  Furthermore, 
no attempt was made at the time to estimate lost votes due to counting errors or less 
benign efforts to corrupt vote counting. 
 
Both Caltech and MIT have a more expansive definition of what constitutes “technology” 
than simply gadgets you build on the shop table or the factory.  Still, the core finding that 
the biggest problems confronting elections in the United States were caused by failures of 
human organization rather than voting machine breakdowns had a profound effect on how 
the larger world of election reform, as well as the VTP itself, framed problems and solutions 
going forward. 
 
In the early days, the VTP was not the only player in the election reform space, but its initial 
quantification of the scope of the problem, and its fundamental agnosticism toward most 
established solutions to election administration failings, were clearly influential as the Help 
America Vote Act was marked up and eventually passed.  (Indeed, the metric it developed 
and championed as a diagnostic for voting machines, the residual vote rate, is now 
enshrined into law as a quantity to be minimized by voting machines.)  HAVA appropriated 
$3 billion, for allocation to the states in order to allow them to improve elections.  A major 
part of that allocation was for technology upgrades, which the VTP had demonstrated could 
reduce the lost vote rate, but it also funded administrative improvements.  In addition, 
HAVA mandated that states establish statewide registration databases and “fail safe” 
provisional ballot laws, in order to minimize votes lost due to registration shortcomings. 
 
In looking back over the past decade and 100 working papers, it is not hard to get a sense 
of pride in what the VTP has helped the nation accomplish.  At the same time, it is hard not 
to ask, “What happened to the technology part of the voting technology project?”  And, by 
technology, I do mean gadgets that can be built in the shop or the factory. 
 
One answer is that the VTP continued to have an influence in the more conventionally 
understood side of voting technology.  Examples include Ted Selker’s work on methods to 
facilitate voting by the disabled; Ron Rivest’s work on encryption, auditing, and the 
“Scantegrity” system; and the “frog” architecture that was advocated in the 2001 report, 
and is still considered by many to be the organizing concept for the “voting machine of the 
future.” 
 
Another answer is that the VTP became distracted, like the rest of the nation, by the 
relatively easy solutions to the big problems the nation faced, which were to throw money 
at states to allow them to abandon lousy antiquated equipment in favor of pretty good 
contemporary equipment, and to mandate that states get their registration systems in 
order.  These were appropriate distractions, given the nature of the problem and the 
available solutions at the time.  Still, it has left the “gadget problem” unsolved, in an even 
more difficult political and fiscal environment. 
 
Nowadays, when I am asked “could Florida happen again?” I answer, “We won’t have any 
more problems of hanging chad, but I actually think the chance of a large-scale meltdown in 
many parts of the county are greater now than they were.  I at least expect ‘another Florida’ 
in my lifetime.”  The reason I answer this way is that innovation in the core technology of 
voting has failed to keep up with the challenges of the voting environment.  At the same 
time, the “new” machines purchased with HAVA money have proven to have shorter life 
spans than initially estimated.  Just as the pregnant chad problem was caused by the failure 
to keep up the maintenance of old technology that inevitably degrades, the “next Florida” is 
likely to come when a cash-strapped county somewhere in America lets its maintenance 
contract lapse, or fails to update its software in time.  (This is in addition to worrying about 
voting tabulation systems that were originally written in Cobol or FORTRAN, and are now 
just marking time.) 
 
In the face of technology challenges that are confronting the voting system in America, the 
voting technology industry has shrunk over the past decade; skepticism about “black box” 
voting has discouraged searches for innovative technologies.  And yet, it seems that the 
next round of challenges will need a larger, more robust voting technology market that can 
innovate, along with a willingness from Congress and state legislatures to fund a more 
active innovation system for voting technology improvements. 
 
Therefore, looking ahead, I can easily see a role for these two great institutions, Caltech and 
MIT, to play in reawakening the nation to the technology problem facing the election 
system, and helping to navigate a path forward.  It is sobering to recall that the Bush-Gore 
recount occurred before the deep partisan divisions that now beset us had arisen in the 
nation — indeed, many credit the recount for being the opening salvo in this new era of 
partisan warfare.  How much more divisive should we expect a technology-failure-driven 
episode of “Bush-Gore II” to be?  The next time, the problem really will be about the voting 
gadgets.  The VTP still has a lot of work to do. 
 
 
 
